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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DANIEL P. REAM,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
DAVID L. FITZEN,
Defendant and Appellant,
Case No. 15220

DAVID L. FITZEN,
Counterclaim Plaintiff
and Appellant,
vs.
PAUL REAM and BANK OF SALT LAKE,
Counterclaim Defendants
and Respondents
REAM'S BARGAIN ANNEX NO. 2,
INCORPORATED, a Utah corporation,
Defendant.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND TO THE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF
THE

SUPRE~~

COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH:

Comes now the appellant, David L. Fitzen, and respectfully requests a rehearing in the above-entitled cause, and that
the decision and opinion of this Honorable Court filed herein on
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June 13, 1978, be reversed for the reason that the Supreme Court
has erred in the following particulars:
POINT I.

THE SUPRErlli COURT ERRED IN DECLINING TO

GRfu~T

APPELLANT RELIEF BY WAY OF REDUCING BY $6,000 THE EQUITY OF THE
RESPONDENT, DAN REAr1, IN THE JOINT VENTURE.
POINT II.

THE SUPRErlli COURT ERRED IN FAILUIG TO GIVE

APPELLANT CREDIT FOR $6,047.47 ACTUALLY RECEIVED AND DEPOSITED IN
THE JOINT VENTURE ACCOUNT.
POINT III.

THE

SUPRE~1E

COURT ERRED IN DETERt'1INING THAT

IT viAS PROPER TO CHARGE PITZEN !-liTH $24,483 RENT.
POINT IV.

THE SUPREilli COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE

ACTION TO DECLARE THE $6,000 SECURITY AGREEHENT (LIEN)

VOID \"lAS

A TORT ACTION AND HENCE A LAI.V ACTION.
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITIO:-l FOR REHEARING
NATURE OF THE CASE
In this action,

the respondent, Dan Ream, and the

appellant, David L. Fitzen, were joint venturers, and each sought
an accounting and a resolution of various disputes bet\veen them.
David L. Pitzen, further seeks to have a purported $6,000 security
agreement against the joint venture declared null and void as to
all parties, and for damages.
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DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Court below, sitting without
a jury.

The Court below rendered judgment on plaintiff's Com-

plaint against the defendant--no cause of action--and rendered
judgment on defendant, Fitzen's, Counterclaim against plaintiff
in the sum of $106.03.

A "verdict of no cause of action" was

entered by the Court in favor of the defendants, Bank of Salt
Lake and Paul Ream, and against the defendant, Fitzen, on his
said Counterclaim against said parties.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court filed an opinion in this matter on
June 13, 1978, affirming the decision of the lower court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON THIS PETITION FOR REHEARING
Petitioner herein seeks a decision on rehearing reversing the judgment of the lower court in the following particulars:
l.

Directing a judgment against the respondent,

Daniel P. Ream, and in favor of appellant in the sum of $6,425.75,
or in the alternative,· for a new trial.
2.

As to defendants, Bank of Salt Lake and Paul Ream,

appellant seeks reversal of judgment in their favor and that this
Court hold that the purported $6,000 security agreement to Paul
Ream is void, and for a new trial on the issue of damages.
3.

In the alternative, for a new trial on all issues.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN DECLINING TO GRANT APPELLANT
RELIEF BY WAY OF REDUCING BY $6,000 THE EQUITY OF THE
RESPONDENT, DAN REA.M, IN THE JOINT VENTURE.
It was conceded by all parties that respondent, Paul

Ream, loaned his son, respondent, Dan Ream, $6,000 with which Dan
made his contribution to the joint venture, and also that Fitzen
contributed $6,000 in cash and property to the joint venture.
(No one has ever asserted that the Paul Ream loan was made to the
joint venture.)
It was likewise undisputed that Dan Ream signed a $6,000
lien on a joint venture truck without the concurring signature of
Fitzen, contrary to the joint venture agreement.
whether appellant, Fitzen, ratified the the lien.

It was disputed
Even assuming

ratification, however, the evidence was established (and it was
uncontradicted)

that the truck was lost to the joint venture by

reason of that lien.

The evidence also established (and it was

likewise undisputed)

that just before repossession by the first

lienholder, the truck could have been sold and the joint venture
would have realized $6,000 over and above the amount of the first
lien.

In Point III of his Brief (and Point III of his Reply Brief)

appellant contended that Dan Ream's equity in the joint venture
should have been reduced by $6,000, which was lost to the joint
venture by reason of Dan Ream's ?ersonal indebtedness to his
father secured by the lien for $6,000 on the truck . .\lso, the
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Joint Venture Agreement ?rovided in paragraph 11 thereof that
"Each of the parties hereto agrees to assume
and pay his own separate debts and to indemnify the
other against the same and all expenses on account
thereof."
In its opinion in this matter, the Supreme Court
held that
"Nhile this contention may have substance, the
record before us precludes us from resolving that
issue."
In this, we think the Court has erred.
As we read the opinion of the Court, the Court apparently felt that the element that is lacking is an accounting of
the "partnership assets".

The opinion states:

"The initial partnership assets consisted of the
1974 vfuite truck and a Caterpillar tractor, and it is
entirely possible that additional assets were acquired,
yet neither of the partners sa1v fit to provide the
trial court with any accounting of those assets."
We think that it is error to speculate as to other possible

assets.

We think it was error to withhold relief to appellant

because the accounting didn't cover possible assets.

Likewise

it is error to deny appellant relief on the basis of lack of
accounting as to the truck or the tractor for these reasons:
(1)

We submit that the parties did include an accounting

of the equipment to the extent nossible.

That is to say, the

payments and expenses of the equipment were set forth.

The

equipment itself couldn't be shown in the accounting because
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the joint venture had no equipment.

The truck and the tractor

were both lost to it, and that was undisputed, and that is certainly why neither party listed those "assets".

The accounting

and the 561 page record were silent as to "other" equipment
because there was none.
(2)

Furthermore, even if the parties had in fact failed to

make a complete accounting of all of the equipment, that should
not have precluded such relief as can be determined from the
matters which are presented.

The proper rule would seem to be

that, as to items not presented in evidence by either party,
such items must be deemed to be neutral; that is, to have no
significant

bearing on the outcome.

In this case, the circumstances of the loss of the
truck and the extent of the loss to the joint venture were introduced in evidence, and relief as to that item should not be denied
because details of some other equipment were not felt by either
party to be material to the outcome of the case.

(To avoid repe-

tition, we refer the Court to page 17 of appellant's Brief and
to pages 13 to 20 of appellant's Reply Brief.
To hold that this matter was not properly raised below
not only brings about a serious injustice to appellant, but also
reflects unfairly upon counsel.
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POINT II.

THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE APPELLANT
CREDIT FOR $6,047.47 ACTUALLY RECEIVED ru~D DEPOSITED
IN THE JOINT VENTURE ACCOUNT.
In Point I of appellant's Brief (page 8) and in Point

I of Appellant's Reply Brief (pages 7 to 10), appellant asserted
that even if it were proper to charge appellant for theoretical
earnings (rent) as opposed to actual earnings, that appellant
should nevertheless receive credit against said sum for amounts
actually collected and deposited in the Fitzen-Ream joint venture checking account.

The receipt of these monies was not dis-

puted, and copies of the deposit records

(which were never con-

tradicted) were introduced in evidence by plaintiff himself as
part of Exhibit P-12.

Copies of those records (5 pages) are

set forth in full next to the end of Appellant's Abstract of
the Transcript of Evidence heretofore filed with this Court on
this appeal.
The Supreme Court has in its opinion denied this relief
to appellant.

The opinion refers to the power of the Supreme Court

to review both law and fact, but in deference to the "better position" of the trial judge to judge "credibility" and observe
"demeanor", the Court declined to change the trial court's accounting.

In reaching this conclusion, the Court was apparently influ-

enced by certain shortcomings in Fitzen's bookkeeping (as the
Court appeared to feel).

We think, however, that in reaching its

decision, the Court has overlooked the fact that the correction
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in the accounting which appellant seeks is based upon undisputed
records.

It is thus not a matter of the lower court's having

an advantaged position, and certainly Fitzen should not be denied
an undisputed credit because of shortcomings relating to other
natters, even assuming such.

The Supreme Court stated the cor-

rect rule in its opinion as follows:
"As has been stated on numerous occasions, we
shall not disturb the findings and judgment unless
they are clearly against the weight of the evidence."
The Court failed to apply that rule to this case and in so doing
has committed error.

It is true that when faced with this rather

obvious error on appeal, respondent has attempted to justify the
error, not by claiming that the said $6,047.47 was not received
and deposited properly, but by claiming that Pitzen's memory was
incomplete on the Fitzen-Ream checking account transactions.
We think it an unfair requirement and not in accord with
equity to insist that Fitzen remember every detail of those transactions as a condition to being allowed credit for undisputed
deposits in that account.

This is particularly so where the

records of the Fitzen-Ream joint venture checking account were
introduced into evidence by plaintiff himself.

It should also be

noted that plaintiff never did demonstrate a single error in those
records at the trial.

In fact, his position at trial was that all

transactions should have been handled through said account.

Onlj

on appeal does he change his position.
1

Bear ?.iver State '3illlk
the Court.

?.

cle=il1, 101 Ct 176, 1:::0 P2d 325 (l94l) :::_ted
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POINT III.

THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT IT WAS
PROPER TO CHARGE PITZEN WITH $24,483 RENT.
In Point I of appellant's Brief (pages 5 to 8) and in

Point I of appellant's Reply Brief (pages 3 to 6), appellant
claimed error by reason of the trial court's charging appellant
with $22,483 rent.

(The opinion of the Supreme Court refers to

this sum as being $24,483.)

Appellant claims that he should only

be held to actual earnings of the equipment, not theoretical
earnings or, in other words, rent.

The Supreme Court nevertheless

has held that it was proper to charge him with "rent".

It would

perhaps serve no useful purpose to repeat appellant's arguments
on this point again except to point out that the decision of the
Court appears to overlook and be in conflict with the case cited
by appellant in his Reply Brief at page 6, to-wit:

Street vs.

Graham, 2 Ut2d 144, 270 P2d 456 (1954), where this Court held that
it was

i~proper

to charge the defendant with the rental value of

the partnership property used by him for his own purposes, but
rather that the proper remedy was an award of one-half of the
actual net profits from use of such equipment.

The recovery was

thus limited to actual receipts, not theoretical receipts.
In the Graham case, plaintiff claimed that defendant
used the partnership equipment for his own purposes and that he
should have to pay the reasonable rental value of the property.
The Court wisely held that, since the parties were partners, it
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would be improper to require more than an accounting for actual
profits.

The Court likewise refused to make the defendant be

responsible to the plaintiff for "idle time" of the equipment.
It is respectfully submitted that this case should be
governed by the Graham vs. Street case, but the opinion in this
case appears to be in direct conflict with that case.
Dunn vs. Baugh, 95 Idaho 236, 506 P2d 463 (1973)

is

cited by the Court for the proposition that Fitzen, as managing
partner, had the burden of proof and persuasion.
not stand for the proposition.

That case does

It stands for the proposition

that:
. the party called upon to render an accounting,
has both the burden of producing evidence and the burden
of persuasion."
(page 465)
Since this is an action for a mutual accounting, Ream
has the burden of establishing actual income claimed by him in
the sum of $22,483.

This he did not establish.

In the Dunn case, at page 465, the Court said:
"We find no authority, and appellant fails to cite
any for the somewhat bizzare proposition that a partner
managing a partnership business must account to his
fellow partner for all partnership debts when the
income from the partnership business is insufficient
to pay the debts."
We think it equally unfair to charge Fitzen for income
never received.
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POINT IV.

THE SUPRE!lli COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACTION
TO DECLARE THE $6,000 SECURITY AGREEMENT (LIEN) VOID
\'lAS A TORT ACTION AND HENCE A LAW ACTION.
This matter was first raised by respondent, Bank of

Salt Lake, in its Brief, and appellant responded thereto in Point
II of appellant's Reply Brief (pages 11 and 12).

Those arguments

will not be repeated here except to say that the Supreme Court,
in concluding that the issue of the validity of the lien is not
subject to review as being in law, looks to form that than substance.

It is true that appellant used the word, "conspiracy",

in his pleadings, but the thrust of the case was to set aside an
instrument which appellant

claimed was void.

the appellant sought relief in equity.

This is to say,

It might be that the dam-

age aspect of appellant's claim against respondents, Paul Ream
and Bank of Salt Lake, is tort and in law, but the nullifying of
a written instrument is equitable, and so far as the validity of
the security agreement (lien)

is concerned, the Supreme Court

should not decline to review the facts as well as the law.
It should be noted that the conspiracy itself is not the
actionable element, but rather the tort committed pursuant to the
conspiracy, if any, and of course an action for damages will lie
for that tort, whatever it may be.

In support, we cite the fol-

lowing from lSA CJS, Section 21 (the same section cited in the
Court's opinion) at page 665:
";fuile an actlon may be for damages suffered by
reason 0f torts committed pursuant to a conspiracy,
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the conspiracy itself, without any actionable wrongs
being done thereunder, ordinarily cannot be made the
subject of a civil action, and may be of no consequence except as bearing on the rules of evidence,
the persons liable or aggravation."
It seems clear that use of the word "conspiracy"
should not deprive appellant of equitable relief (quite apart
from damages) and to a proper review by the Supreme Court of
the equitable issue of the nullification of the written instrument.

It requires no citation of authority, we think, to sup-

port the proposition that in Utah equitable issues and legal
issues can exist in the same suit, and review should be forthcoming according to the nature of the issue.
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CONCLUSION
We, therefore, respectfully submit that the decision
of the Supreme Court entered on June 13, 1978, is in error and
pray that the Supreme Court direct entry of judgment in favor
of the appellant and against the respondent, Daniel P. Ream,
in the sum of $6,425.75, or in the alternative, for a new trial.
This sum is arrived at as follows:

The accounting adopted by

the lower court charged Fitzen with $22,483 rent.

If the Supreme

Court determines this to have been error, it is submitted that
the most the record would support in actual income to the joint
venture would be $15,795.

From this figure should be deducted

the sum of $6,047.47 actually received and deposited into the
Fitzen-Ream joint venture checking account.
net figure of $9,747.53 chargeable to Fitzen.

This would leave a
If that figure

is substituted in the lower court's accounting for the $22,483,
it will result in an increased judgment to Fitzen of $6,425.75.
(These computations are more fully set forth at pages 6 to 8 of
appellant's Brief.)
We further pray that the Court reverse the judgment of
the lower court and adjudge that the purported $6,000 security
agreement to defendant, Paul Ream, is void, and that a new trial
be granted on the issue of damages; or, in the alternative, for
a new trial on all issues.
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The foregoing Petition for Rehearing and Brief in
Support thereof is respectfully submitted this

day

of June, 1978.
ROMNEY, MADSEN & CUMMINGS
Gordon A. Madsen
Attorneys for Appellant

Mailed two copies of the within Brief to each of the
following attorneys, postage prepaid, this 30th day of June,
1978:
William J. Cayias
1558 South 11th East Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
Attorney for Respondent,
Dan Ream
John A. Snow
141 East First South Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Respondent,
Bank of Salt Lake
Ray H. Ivie
P. 0. Box 672
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorney for Respondent,
Paul Ream

~ttorney

for ripnellant
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